Proposal explorer
drafted under the Commonwealth Corporation Act
The undersigned organize the following enterprise as a Commonwealth Corporation:
All ownership — voting power and rights to profit alike — is divided among three classes. No class may hold less than twenty percent (20%) nor more than forty percent (40%), and the three shall always total one hundred percent (100%).
Tradeable shares — the capital investors
Community is the remainder; it never leaves the 20–40% band
Share of profit distributed each year
Price ÷ earnings, for the community stake's fair value
Market rate on the workers' bought-in slice
Share of the worker dividend that services the loan
Real annual growth of distributed profit
the public’s cut stops being a tax and becomes ownership — and the slice above 20% is bought at fair value, not taken · recomputes with your charter
per full-time worker · the loan is serviced first, then the full dividend flows · dashed rule marks payoff
The same rules, projected nationwide. Adoption is not a forecast — you choose it, and the model follows.
By profit, at maturity — you choose, the model follows
cumulative · community shares at market value plus dividends received, against Treasury outlay plus forgone tax · today's dollars
Method. The certificates are arithmetic, not forecasts: every figure is a direct consequence of the charter you set. You choose the split (each class 20–40%, summing to 100), the company, the payout ratio, the valuation multiple, and the loan terms; everything else is derived. The investor raise factor prices the community shares above the base 20% at fair value, matched by the Treasury round for round; the worker slice is a market-rate loan from investors, repaid out of worker dividends (so high-multiple companies take longer to pay it off — an honest consequence, not a bug). Tax figures are federal only — state corporate taxes are omitted, as is the uncapped QSBS-style exemption. The payout ratio is a real dial: earnings a company retains pay the public nothing that year (the dial lives in Schedule A, on The Charter tab). Across America, adoption is never forecast — you set the share of US corporate profit that goes G-Corp, and it follows a fixed S-curve toward that ceiling; it does not respond to the tax toggle. Baselines mirror the Fund model: US corporate profit ≈ $3.5T today growing 2%/yr real, all figures in today’s dollars.
How the public’s position is scored. Comparing one year’s community dividends against that year’s forgone tax — the “net cash” column — is negative in every year at the proposed charter, because the community collects payout × its share (50% × 30% = 15% of profit) against a 21% corporate rate. That is a true statement about cash and a misleading one about the proposal, because the Treasury’s outlay buys a permanent asset. So the tiles and the chart above report the balance sheet: what the public holds (its shares at market value, plus every dividend received) against everything it gave up to hold them (Treasury outlay plus forgone tax). The public is ahead from the first year, which is not a surprise but an accounting fact — the base 20% is granted in exchange for the exemption, and a stake worth ~5 years of profit is set against ~0.2 years of tax annually. The stake is marked at the same valuation multiple as the rest of the page; it is an illiquid holding the Fund may not sell (Charter Article I.3), not a war chest. The per-worker dividend is an average, and a generous one: profit grows 2%/yr real here while employment is held flat, so it embeds 25 years of rising profit per worker (≈$3,900/yr in today’s terms against ≈$6,400 in 2054’s). Sector medians run lower still — around $3,750, from ≈$600 in food service to ≈$24,750 in software.
When the public owns a slice of a company, who decides how it votes? Not politicians — a charter. Pick the rules below, then watch the Fund vote on six real situations. The Fund never initiates; it can accomplish nothing alone.
of the Giving America Fund and participating State Funds, governing all Community Shares held in Commonwealth Corporations (G-Corps)
We hold that ownership rights belong to those who give. The people of the United States, through their sovereign funds, are owners of every Commonwealth Corporation — not by taking, but by giving: their capital, paid in full and at fair value; their labor, their custom, and their communities, in which every corporation lives. This Charter binds the Fund to steward that ownership so that every company it owns may profit, endure, and widen its people’s capacity to contribute — and to restructure what is extractive into mutual giving.
any executive compensation exceeding twenty times (20×) the pay of the company’s median worker.
any proposal to disclose product safety, environmental impact, or workforce conditions.
the annual publication of the company’s charter compliance report.
Where a vote raises a question no standing rule decides, the Fund abstains, and refers the question to its staff, who consult these principles and publish the answer in the Fund’s public guidebook — which thereafter governs all like questions.
All dividends received upon Community Shares are distributed to the social programs of the Giving America roadmap, and to no other purpose. The Fund keeps nothing for itself beyond its published costs of administration.
This Charter may be amended only slowly, and only by the people it serves. For a State Fund: by ballot measure of the people of the state. For the Giving America Fund: by double enactment — passage of identical text by two successive Congresses, with a federal election between them. No officer, board, or single administration may amend it.
Adopted under the Commonwealth Corporation Act. This Charter is a public document. Every vote cast under it is a public record.
Set the standing rules, then watch them govern. The three principles below are the fallback where no rule answers — not a control.
The Fund votes against CEO pay above this multiple of the median worker.
How votes are counted. An ordinary measure carries when more shares vote for it than against — shares that abstain count for neither side. A fundamental question — a charter amendment, sale, merger, relocation, dissolution, or de-conversion — needs a two-thirds supermajority; because the Fund’s community shares stand “no” by default, that supermajority must come from the worker and investor classes themselves.
A group of workers, uneasy about what the plant releases into the river, put an emissions-disclosure bylaw to a vote. Investors see cost and liability and line up against it. On their own, the workers are outnumbered.
The Fund is a standing coalition partner for insiders' conscience — the amplifier, never the initiator. It turns a worker minority into a majority, but only once the workers move first.
The board brings a routine vote: a pay package for the incoming CEO worth 34 times what the company's median worker earns. It sits within market norms, and the investor class is ready to wave it through.
Mechanical rules, zero discretion. The Fund exercises no judgment — it reads the pay ratio against the cap you set and votes accordingly.
Investors propose a “streamlined testing” program to get products to market faster. No standing rule speaks to it, and the workers are wary of what “streamlined” might mean for safety. The question is genuinely new.
Principles become precedent become rules. Faced with a question no rule answers, the Fund abstains, consults its principles, and writes down an answer that governs every like case after.
A larger C-corp offers to buy the company outright at a 25% premium. Investors are enthusiastic; the workers split down the middle, torn between the payout and the life of the company. A sale is a fundamental change to the charter itself.
The standing “no” turns every fundamental change into a decision workers and investors must carry by supermajority on their own. The community neither initiates nor vetoes — it only raises the bar.
The company's app has quietly been tuned to reward outrage, because outrage keeps people scrolling. Everyone can see it; workers grumble, investors shrug, users complain. But no one has put anything to a vote.
This is the honest answer to “isn't this just state control?” With no ballot before it, the Fund does nothing at all. It cannot reach into the business on its own — that passivity is the design, not a flaw.
A year later, a near-identical “streamlined testing” proposal comes back around — this time with explicit safety carve-outs. The workers are wary again; the investors are for it. But this question is no longer new.
Precedent hardens into rule. What once required staff judgment now resolves automatically, the way every standing rule began.
Method. This deck is illustrative, not exhaustive — six situations chosen to show how the charter behaves, not a catalogue of every vote a company faces. The positions of the investor and worker blocs are stipulated per scenario; only the Fund’s vote is computed from the rules you set. Share weights use the 40/30/30 default charter (investors 40, workers 30, community 30). Every resolution is a mechanical reading of the charter — the Fund holds no discretion the charter has not written down.